Capacity Matters: Short Formations & Excessive Standing

The UK rail industry is often portrayed as heavily regulated, yet when it comes to train capacity—the simple matter of having enough space to board or sit—the system remains largely unaccountable to passengers. Across the country, and especially in underserved regions such as Lincolnshire and the East Riding of Yorkshire, passengers routinely find themselves standing for an hour or more, or unable to board at all due to overcrowded and short-formed trains. These are not isolated incidents, nor are they mere irritations. They are a structural failure of a system that prioritises train punctuality over passenger experience.

Today, there is no statutory requirement for operators to provide a minimum number of seats on a given service. Capacity targets exist, but they are set internally within rail contracts, not through public-facing passenger rights. In practice, a train that is short-formed—from four coaches down to two, for example—is still considered to have “run” and counts toward the operator’s performance score. As long as the service is not cancelled or delayed beyond a certain threshold, the passenger is left to absorb the inconvenience—and the discomfort—alone.

The situation in Lincolnshire exemplifies the problem. On the busy Nottingham–Lincoln route, East Midlands Railway has acknowledged that services are frequently overcrowded. Internal data from 2024 revealed that four out of five morning peak trains from Nottingham had standing passengers, and weekend services into Lincoln had more than 65 instances of “full and standing” trains reported within a matter of weeks. These are local services with limited frequency; if you’re unable to board, the next train could be an hour or more away.

In the East Riding of Yorkshire, passengers travelling from Beverley, Cottingham or Hull face similar issues. During the timetable chaos of 2018, MPs reported “overcrowded services frequently running with reduced numbers of carriages” on key Northern and TransPennine Express (TPE) routes. That pattern has persisted. During 2022–23, TPE regularly cancelled and short-formed services due to rolling stock and crew shortages. The Hull–Manchester route became notorious for forcing commuters to stand the entire way, or worse, to miss their train altogether.

Short formations are tracked within National Rail Contracts via benchmarks known as “Declared Train Capacity” (DTC). Operators are contractually obliged to meet a minimum declared capacity on nearly all services. For example, Great Western Railway reports that 99.2% of its services meet this standard, implying short formations on around 0.8% of services. When operators miss this benchmark, they are sanctioned under the contract’s Operational Performance (OP) Targets. But here lies the crux: these penalties are paid to the Department for Transport, not the passenger. They disappear into the wider funding pot—offering no redress to those left standing in a vestibule, or unable to board at all.

This differs starkly from Delay Repay, which compensates passengers for delayed journeys over a prescribed time threshold—typically 15 or 30 minutes. If a train is on time but dangerously overcrowded or short-formed, no compensation is automatically due. A passenger standing from Lincoln to Peterborough, or from Hull to Leeds, receives nothing unless their journey is delayed. And if they cannot board, it’s not officially classed as a delay unless they choose to wait for the next service, reach their destination late, and file a claim—assuming they have the time, energy, and evidence to do so. Even then, any compensation is at the train operator’s discretion—their train ran on time, remember?

This disconnect is unsustainable. While operators are rightly sanctioned for failing to provide planned capacity, the current regime lacks any direct restitution for those most affected. It is time to reform this model. Financial penalties for short-formations and chronic overcrowding must be paired with passenger-facing compensation. If the railway expects passengers to pay full fare, then those passengers should expect a basic standard of space. If that space isn’t delivered, the burden should not fall solely on the traveller.

One solution would be to mirror the logic of Delay Repay. Where operators fail to meet a defined capacity threshold—based on expected passenger numbers and historic load data—passengers could receive automatic partial refunds. Clauses such as the “Passenger in Excess of Capacity” (PiXC) targets already exist in Department for Transport contracts; these should be tied not just to internal performance metrics, but to real compensation mechanisms. PiXC already measures when loadings exceed agreed capacity, particularly in peak periods. In 2023, this occurred on more than 200 peak trains daily. That should trigger more than just internal reporting—it should activate meaningful restitution.

Some may argue that operators cannot be held responsible for every breakdown or fleet shortage. That is true. But water companies are penalised for leakage, even when external factors are involved. Energy firms are fined for service interruptions. The number of tolerable water leaks is manipulated by government-set targets for water companies. Rail should be no different. If operators routinely short-form services or run standing-room-only conditions, they must answer to both the DfT and the passenger.

Capacity must be considered an essential service standard, not a bonus. It is not enough that a train runs. It must run with enough space for those who need it. Until this principle is embedded in regulation, the passenger will continue to be the last to benefit when things go wrong.